Civil Law: Contract of Agency, Contract to Sell Real Properties
Sally Yoshizaki, Petitioner, vs. Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc., Respondents
G.R. No. 174978; July 31, 2013
Facts: Richard and Linda Johnson were members of Joy Training’s Board of Trustees who sold the real properties, a wrangler jeep, and other personal properties in favor of the spouses Sally and Yoshio Yoshizaki. Joy Training filed an action for cancellation of sales alleging that the spouses Johnson is without the requisite authority from the Board of Directors. The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Yoshizaki. It found that Joy Training owned the real properties and it authorized he spouses Johnson to sell the real properties. It recognized that there were only five actual members of the board of trustees; consequently, a majority of the board of trustees validly authorized the sale. It also ruled that the sale of personal properties was valid because they were registered in the spouses Johnson’s name. The CA upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case but reversed its ruling with respect to the sale of real properties. It also ruled that the resolution is void because it was not approved by a majority of the board of trustees.
Issue: Was there a contract of agency to sell the real properties between Joy Training and the spouses Johnson?
Ruling: The SC ruled that there was no contract of agency between Joy Training and the spouses Johnson to sell the parcel of land with its improvements. Art. 1868 of the Civil Code defines a contract of agency as a contract whereby a person “binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.” It may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. In this case, the presented evidence did not convince the SC of the existence of the contract of agency to sell the real properties. The certification is a mere general power of attorney which comprises all of Joy training. Art. 1877 of CC clearly states that an agency couched in general terms comprises only acts of administration, even if the principal should state that he withholds no power or that the agent may execute such acts as he may authorize as general and unlimited management.
Civil Law: Eminent Domain, Easement, Right of Way
Spouses Jesus L. Cabahug and Coronacion M. Cabahug, Petitioners, vs.
National Power Corporation, Respondent
G.R. No. 186069; January 30, 2013
Facts: Spouses Cabahug, being owners of two parcels of land which were subjected to expropriation proceedings by the National Power Corporation (NPC). NPC electrical cables would be installed in the portions of the province and would traverse the land owned by the petitioners. Cabahug, in consideration of the easement fees, granted NPC a continuous easement right of way. Two years thereafter, Cabahug filed a complaint before RTC for payment of just compensation after having learned that the compensation given by NPC was very low compared to the appraisal made by the province of Leyte. RTC rendered decision in favor of Cabahug. However, at the Court of Appeals, it was ruled that vested right has already accrued in favour of NPC, and to allow spouses Cabahug to pursue the case would be a violation of the contract and an unjust enrichment in favour of Cabahug.
Issue: Whether or not NPC may still be held liable to pay for the full market value of the affected property despite the fact transfer of title thereto was not required by the easement.
Ruling: Yes. The power of Eminent Domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the expropriator in easement of right of way. Just compensation which should be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property is, moreover, due where the nature and effect of the easement is to impose limitations against the use of the land for an indefinite period and deprive the landowner if ordinary use.
Civil Law: Property and Lease; Public Domain; Patrimonial Property
Dream Village Neighborhood Association Inc., Represented by its Incumbent President, Greg Seriego, Petitioner, vs. Bases Conversion Development Authority, Respondent
G.R. No. 192896, July 24, 2013
Facts: Dream Village, composed of more than 2,000 families have been occupying the disputed lot continuously, exclusively and notoriously since the year 1985. Said lot used to be a part of the Hacienda de Maricaban, which was subsequently purchased by the government of the United States of America (USA) and was converted to Fort William McKinley. Later on, USA transferred 30 hectares of it to the Manila Railroad Company, while the rest were still in the name of US Government. Finally, on December of 1956, the US government ceded Fort William McKinley to the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and was renamed Fort Bonifacio, reserved for military purposes. On January 1986, President Marcos Issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable, thus allowing sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan. President Corazon Aquino on the other hand amended the proclamation of Pres. Marcos and limited the lots which were open for disposition. On March of 1992, the Bases conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) was created to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Military Reservations to productive civilian uses, which then authorized the President of the Philippines to sell the lands covered in whole or in part, specifically to raise capital for the BCDA. BCDA asserted its title to Dream Village owing to the fact that BCDA’s titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid and commercially valuable to the agency, however, due to the passage of time, was contended to have been abandoned to Dream Village, and that BCDA’s right over it has already prescribed.
Issue: Whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription.
Ruling: No. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription (Art.1113, NCC). Also, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. It is also stipulated under PD 1529 that before the acquisitive prescription can commence, the property must expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of national wealth, and that absent such express declaration, the land remains to be property of public dominion. Subsequent proclamations over vast portions of Maricaban exempted the lot where Dream Village was situated from being open for disposition, thus Fort Bonifacio remains a property of public Dominion of the State because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or development of national wealth, and thus, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run. Thus, the area occupied by Dream Village is still not susceptible of acquisition by prescription.
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